This paper shows that budget deficits account for a relatively small fraction of debt growth and that stock-flow reconciliation, which is often considered a residual entity, is one of the key determinants of debt dynamics. After having explained the importance of the stock-flow reconciliation, the paper shows that this residual entity can be partly explained by contingent liabilities and balancesheet effects.
Introduction
How do countries get into debt? The answer to this question may seem trivial. Countries accumulate debt whenever they run a budget deficit (i.e., whenever public expenditure is higher than revenues). In fact, the standard Economics 101 debt accumulation equation states that the change in the stock of debt is equal to the budget deficit: (1) and that the stock of debt is equal to the sum of past budget deficits:
Whoever has worked with actual debt and deficit data knows that Equation (1) rarely holds and that debt accumulation can be better described as:
where t SF is what is usually called "stock-flow reconciliation." Clearly, Equation (1) is a good approximation of debt accumulation only if one assumes that t SF is not very large. The purpose of this paper is to describe some of t SF 's main characteristics. The paper shows that, contrary to what is usually assumed, the budget deficit accounts for a small fraction of the within-country variance of the change in debt over GDP and that stock-flow reconciliation plays an important role in explaining debt dynamics. The paper also shows that, on average, t SF tends to be positive and that there are large cross-country differences in the magnitude of this residual entity. This suggests that the magnitude of stock-flow reconciliation is not likely to be purely due to random measurement error. In particular, the paper shows that the problem is especially serious in developing countries and, among this group of countries, the difference between debt and deficit is particularly large in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa.
The paper also runs a set of regressions aimed at explaining the main determinants of the magnitude of the stock-flow reconciliation and finds that balance-sheet effects due to real depreciations and contingent liabilities that arise at time of banking crises are strongly correlated with the difference between deficit and change in debt. However, the paper also shows that the regressions can only explain 20 percent of the within-country variance of the stock-flow reconciliation and that there is still much that we do not understand about one of the main determinants of debt accumulation.
While we are not the first to show that stock-flow reconciliation is an important part of debt dynamic (see, among others IMF, 2003; Martner and Tromben, 2004; European Commission, 2005; Budina and Fiess, 2005) , we are not aware of any other paper that systematically describes the main characteristics of this residual, but extremely important, determinant of debt accumulation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our main sources of data and presents some basic facts on public debt and deficit. Section 3 focuses on a detailed description of the stock-flow reconciliation. Section 4 runs a set of regressions aimed at explaining the main determinants of the stock flow reconciliation. Section 5 concludes.
Data
The purpose of this section is to describe our data on fiscal deficit and public debt. In this context, it is worth mentioning that obtaining reliable and comparable data on the stock public debt is a rather difficult exercise. In fact, the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) and IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS), which are the most common sources of cross-country data on government statistics, report data for a rather limited set of countries. This is even the case for industrial countries; these sources do not report recent data on public debt for Japan and Italy, for example. Furthermore, most cross-country datasets do not make an effort to make the data comparable across countries (for a discussion of these issues, see IMF, 2003) . 2 Although there are now some papers that attempt to build comparable cross-country datasets on public debt (Cowan et al., 2005; Jeanne and Guscina, 2006; IMF, 2003; Budina and Fiess, 2005) , some of these data sets are not publicly available and all of them have a limited country and time coverage. As a consequence, we do not rely on these new data and only use publicly available sources (hence, the caveats mentioned above should be kept in mind). In particular, we start with IFS and GFS and supplement them with data collected from national sources (mostly from the websites or publications of the various Ministries of Finance), the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean (ECLAC, see Martner and Tromben, 2004) , and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Using these various sources, we assemble an unbalanced panel covering 117 countries and consisting of approximately 1,900 observations. While long time series are available for some countries (e.g., Bahamas, Burundi, Costa Rica, Iceland, Norway and the US have more than 30 years of data), for others there are very few observations (Albania, Algeria, Gabon, Sudan, Togo, and Yemen are among the countries with less than five years of data). Table 1 shows that the sample mean of the deficit to GDP ratio is 4.04 percent and that average deficit tends to decrease with the level of income. The region with the highest average deficit is South Asia (6.5 percent), followed by the Middle East (5.6 percent), and Sub-Saharan Africa (4.2 percent). Latin American countries tend to have fairly low levels of average deficit (just below the cross-country average) but the region is far from being homogeneous and is characterized by the largest variance in the sample. America has a level of debt that is just below the sample average and is not much higher than that of the industrial countries included in our sample. Again, we find that Latin America is one of the most heterogeneous regions in our sample (in this case, second only to Sub-Saharan Africa). As one may expect, we find that most of the variance in debt-to-GDP is due to differences across countries (this is the between standard deviation). However, there is also substantial variance within countries. In fact, the within standard deviation (not reported in the table) is often close to 50 percent of the between standard deviation. Table 2 with Table   3 , we find that the value of t i d , is almost five percentage points higher than average deficit over GDP, indicating that more than 50 percent of the average change in debt is not explained by deficit. 4 The Table also shows that while the difference between t i d , and the deficit is fairly small in industrial countries (about 0.3 percentage points), this difference is extremely large in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, where the average deficit is about one-third the average change in debt.
We can now describe the characteristics of the stock-flow reconciliation by defining the following measure of the difference between change in debt and deficit for country i at time t. δ and shows that the change in debt is nearly five percentage points higher than the deficit (with the highest values in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa). However, the Table also shows that there are several countries with extremely large values of t i, δ (in some cases well above 200 percent). In Latin America, for instance, the difference between the change in debt and deficit has a range of 350 percentage points (from -73 3 It is important to note that we do not use the change in the debt-over-GDP ratio (i.e., 100 1 1 ,
but the change in debt divided by GDP at time t (i.e.,
). As nominal GDP growth (g) tends to be positive, t i d , is usually larger than t i, θ . We use this measure, rather than the standard t i, θ because we want to isolate changes in debt from changes in the level of GDP. 4 Using a different methodology and a shorter sample, IMF (2003) also finds similar but less drastic results. In particular, it finds that more than 25 percent of the increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio of a sample of emerging market countries over the 1997-2003 period is due to off balance-sheet factors. In a sample of 21 market-access countries, Budina and Fiess (2005) find that debt over GDP increased by 22.8 percentage points from 1994 to 2002, while real GDP grew by 9.3 percent, yielding a change in debt of approximately 37 percent. The deficit (primary plus interest rate bill) explained about one-third of this change while other factors (including the real exchange rate) explained the remaining two-thirds. to 281). The industrial countries have the smallest range, but even in this case the range is close to 30 percentage points. These extreme values are due either to exceptional events or measurement error. In the second column of Table 5 , the average value of t i, δ is computed by dropping the top and bottom 2 percent of the distribution. After dropping these outliers, we find that t i, δ has an average value of 3 percent and that the average values of t i, δ for Latin America and the Middle East drop from 7 percent to 4 and 2 percent, respectively.
It is also interesting to see which countries tend to have large values of t i, δ . Table 5 summarizes all the episodes for which 10 , > While this paper focuses on change in debt, we obtain the same results if we use the standard decomposition of the change in debt over GDP (θ). 5 Figure 1 shows that in most regions the stock flow adjustment is the main determinant of debt growth and inflation is the main determinant of debt reduction
Debt and Deficit
The previous section showed that simple comparisons of average values of deficit over GDP and change in debt indicate that Equation (1) is far from being a good approximation of the main determinants of debt accumulation and that what is usually considered a residual entity (the 5 The standard decomposition takes the following form:
where the first term on the RHS of the equation is the contribution of the primary deficit, the second term is the interest bill, the third term is the contribution of nominal growth (which can be split into real growth and inflation) and the last term is the stock-flow adjustment. stock-flow reconciliation) is a key determinant of debt accumulation. In this section, we use different strategies to provide more evidence in this direction.
Regressions Analysis
One way to assess the importance of t SF is to divide debt and deficit by current GDP and use our large panel to estimate the following fixed effects regression:
where i α is a country fixed effect (the country fixed effects control for the fact that the data come from different sources, countries have different levels of debt, and they use different methodologies for computing debt and deficit) and i t def , is deficit over GDP. If Equation (1) holds, we expect a high R 2 (the regression's R 2 should be 1 if Equation 1 holds exactly), i α =0, and β =1. Hence, the regression's coefficients and R 2 can be used to asses the relative (un)importance of the deficit in explaining changes in debt. Table 6 reports the results of the estimation of Equation (4) for different sub-samples of countries. Column 1 describes the basic pattern. First of all, we find that β is greater than 1 (but not significantly different from 1) indicating that a 1 percent increase in the deficit to GDP ratio tends to translate into a 1.3 percent increase of the debt to GDP ratio. More interestingly, the regression's R 2 shows that, in our sample of countries, deficits explain less than 8 percent of the within country variance of i t d , and that t SF explains more than 90 percent of the variance. 6
As the low R2 could be due to the presence of outliers, in Column 2 we drop 47 outliers (defined as observations that have residuals with an absolute value greater than 2.5 standard deviations). After dropping these outliers, β drops to 1.18, but we still find that our model can only explain 23 percent of the variance of i t d , . Figure 2 plots the fit of the regression reported in Column 2 and illustrates that the low R2 is not due to a few episodes with a particularly low fit, but that most countries have observations that are far away from the regression's line. Column 3
of Table 4 addresses the outlier issues by running the same regression as in Column 1 using a median quantile regression with bootstrapped standard errors (STATA's BSQREG) and shows that in this case, the coefficient of the deficit variable drops to 0.87 and the R2 goes to 0.24.
The remaining columns run separate regressions for different regions of the world. 
Theoretical R2
As an alternative way to describe the pattern documented above, we build a measure aimed at determining which countries have the largest deviation from the theoretical identity def d = .
Clearly, such a measure cannot be the country average of t i, δ described in Table 5 because negative and positive values of t i, δ would compensate each other. One possibility would be to adopt a strategy similar to the one of the previous section and run country-by-country regressions of DEBT Δ over DEFICIT and use the fit of these regressions (their R2) as a measure of how much a country deviates from def d = .
One problem with this strategy is that it would not help to differentiate countries that have a good fit in which def d = holds, from countries that have a good fit but where the relationship between debt and deficit can be better described with an equation of the type: values that range between 1 and 1.5, and the remaining 20 percent have higher values. Table 7 shows that the mean and median of the distribution of i φ is approximately 1 and that, as 7 It may seem surprising that while the theoretical distribution is highly skewed, the data of Table 7 indicate that the mean is identical to the median. This is due to the fact that Table 7 does not include four countries that have values of φ greater than 4 (these countries are Estonia, Seychelles, Luxembourg, and Sudan). If we include these countries, the median goes to 1.05, but the average jumps to 2.7.
Debt Explosions
So far, we documented that there are a large differences between deficit and change in debt. Now we explore whether the difference between these two variables is positively correlated with debt growth. Figure 5 plots the relationship between the growth rate of debt over GDP (defined as
) and the ratio between deficit and change in debt (defined as
). 8 It shows that at relatively low levels of debt growth (below 5 percent per year), the deficit explains approximately 80 percent of the change of debt. However, when debt starts growing at a faster rate, the share of debt explained by deficit drops dramatically. In particular, the figure shows that when annual debt growth reaches 10 percent of GDP, the deficit explains less than 40 percent of debt growth. 
ρ does not vary much across groups of countries.
As a last exercise, we look at debt explosions (defined as episodes in which t i, θ >10); Table 9 summarizes the data and Table A4 lists all the episodes. The first panel of Table 9 shows that in the 172 episodes for which t i, θ >10 (9 percent of the country-years for which we have data), the average increase in debt over GDP was close to 28 percentage points, the average change in debt was around 46 percentage points (the difference between these two values is nominal GDP growth which, in presence of high inflation, can be very high), and the average ratio between these two variables was 70 percent. The fourth column of the table shows that in our sample of debt explosions, average deficit was close to 10 percent of GDP and the ratio between deficit and change in debt was about 27 percent. This is close to one-third of the same ratio during normal times (when 10> t i, θ >0 the ratio between deficit and change in debt is 75 percent). The table also shows that the regions with the highest occurrence of debt explosions are Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa (41 and 66 episodes, respectively) and that East Europe 8 We smooth the curve with a bandwidth of 25. and Sub-Saharan Africa are the regions with the lowest average ratio between deficit and change in debt (18 and 13 percent, respectively).
Since the average values discussed above may be driven by extreme values of t i, θ , we restrict the sample in the second panel of Table 9 to 104 episodes for which t i, θ ranges between 10 and 20 percent. In this case, we find that the average increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio is approximately 14 percent, the average change in debt is 24 percent and the average ratio between these two variables is 68 percent (basically identical to the top panel of the table). The fourth column of the table shows that the average deficit is 7 percent and that the ratio between average deficit and change in debt is 29 percent, which again is close to the top panel of the table. As before, we find that Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa have the highest occurrence of debt explosions (18 and 36, respectively), but now we find that the Middle East and the industrial countries have a number of episodes that are not much lower than those of Latin America. In fact, we now find that Latin America has the second lowest (after the industrial countries) relative share of debt explosions. This confirms that debt explosions in Latin America tend to be very large. In fact, Latin America is the only region in the world where there are more episodes in which debt grows by more than 20 percent of GDP than episodes in which debt grows between 10 and 20 percent of GDP.
What Drives the Difference?
After having documented that there are large differences between deficits and change in debt, we now run a set of regressions aimed at exploring the determinants of these differences. We start by estimating the following model:
where i α is a set of country fixed effects, t i X , a set of country-year specific variables that can explain the difference between deficit and change in debt, and δ should be positively correlated with nominal GDP growth, which is heavily influenced by inflation.
One reason why the change in debt could be higher than the recorded deficit is the valuation effects due to currency depreciations in the presence of foreign currency debt. To explore this possibility, we start by focusing on developing countries (industrial countries do not have large stocks of foreign currency debt) and use data from the World Bank's Global Development Finance (GDF) to create three dummy variables that classify all developing countries into three groups of equal size. 9 The three dummies are defined as follows: (i) LOW takes a value of 1 for all country-years where the external debt-to-GDP ratio is below 38 percent;
(ii) MEDIUM takes a value of 1 for all country-years where the external debt-to-GDP ratio ranges between 38 and 64 percent; (iii) HIGH takes a value of 1 for all country-years where the external debt-to-GDP ratio is above 64 percent. Next, we interact the three dummies with the change in the real exchange rate (DRER, an increase in DRER corresponds to a real depreciation).
Column 1 of Table 10 reports the results of our baseline estimation. As expected, we find that inflation has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Furthermore, we find that currency depreciations are positively and significantly correlated with δ , a finding that provides evidence of the presence of balance-sheet effects. More interestingly, we find that the effect of currency depreciations is particularly large in countries with high levels of external debt.
Consider, for instance, a real depreciation of 30 percent (not an uncommon event in some of the countries included in our sample). In countries characterized by low or medium levels of external debt, such a depreciation is associated with an increase of δ of approximately three to four percentage points, but in countries with high levels of debt, a similar depreciation would instead cause δ to increase by more than 10 percentage points. At the bottom of the table we show that the difference between coefficients is also statistically significant (this is not the case for the difference between the coefficients associated with low and medium external debt).
Next, we include industrial countries and assume that this set of countries has no foreign currency denominated external debt. Therefore, the regression coefficients should be interpreted as follows: DRER measures the effect of real depreciations in industrial countries; DRER+DRER*LOW measures the effect of a real depreciation in developing countries with low levels of external debt; DRER+DRER*MEDIUM measures the effect of a real depreciation in developing countries with average levels of external debt; and DRER+DRER*HIGH measures the effect of a real depreciation in developing countries with high levels of external debt. Column 2 shows that the coefficient of DRER is low and not statistically significant, indicating that there are no balance-sheet effects in industrial countries. As before, we find that balance-sheet effects are important in developing countries and that the effect of a real depreciation in all three groups of developing countries is significantly different (both in economic and statistical terms) from the effect of a depreciation in industrial countries. Finally, we still find that balance-sheet effects tend to be particularly important in countries with high levels of debt.
Column 3 explores the role of default, w expect defaults to be associated with debt reduction and hence negatively correlated with δ . To capture the effect of default, we use data from Standard and Poor's and build a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 around the last year of a default episode (in particular, it takes a value of 1 in the last year of the episode and in the year before and the year after the last year of the episode). Next, we build a default dummy that takes a value of 1 in the last year of a Paris club rescheduling and then another dummy that takes a value of 1 whenever the GDF reports that a country has rescheduled its debt. Finally, we build a dummy called DEFAULT that takes a value of 1 whenever one of the previously described dummies takes a value of 1. Column 3 shows that the default dummy has the expected negative sign but that the coefficient is small and not statistically significant (we obtain similar results if we use the three dummies separately).
Column 4 uses data from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) to explore the role of banking crises. These are important events because they generate a series of contingent liabilities and other off-balance sheet activities that can translate into debt explosions. As expected, we find that the coefficient of the banking crisis dummy is positive and statistically significant. The coefficient is also quantitatively important, indicating that the average banking crisis is associated with an increase of three percentage points in δ .
Column 5 jointly includes all the variables discussed above. We find that the results are qualitatively similar to previous ones, but that the coefficient of DRER*MEDIUM is no longer statistically significant (however, DRER+ DRER*MEDIUM remains significant) and that the same is true for banking crisis. In the last column of the table, we control for year fixed effects (which implicitly control for global shocks) and show that their inclusion does not affect our basic results.
It is interesting to note that the set of controls included in the regressions of Table 10 explains about 20 percent of the variance of δ and that the country fixed effects explain about 30 percent of the variance of δ (see last row of Table 10 ). This indicates that country specific factors explain most of the variance of δ and corroborates the findings of Table 4 , which showed that there are large cross-country differences in the average value of δ . There are two possible explanations for this finding. The first has to do with the fact that measurement errors that lead to an underestimation of the deficit are more important in some countries than in others, which is probably related to the fact that poorer countries have less sophisticated accounting and budgeting systems. The other has to do with the fact that the importance of contingent liabilities that lead to debt explosions vary across countries and that our set of controls does not capture all these contingent liabilities. 10 Table 11 includes GDP growth in the analysis. The first column shows that debt tends to grow more than deficit during periods of slow GDP growth. Column 2 substitutes GDP growth with two dummies variables that take a value of 1 during periods of high growth (GOOD TIMES) and periods of slow growth (BAD TIMES). 11 Also in this case, we find that debt tends to grow faster than the deficit during bad times and slower than the deficit during good times.
Column 3 augments the regression in Column 1 with the set of controls in Table 10 . We find that the sign of GDP growth remains negative but the coefficient drops by one-third and is no longer statistically significant. Column 4 uses the set of controls in Table 10 and the GOOD TIMES and BAD TIMES dummies. In this case, we still find that the two dummies have the opposite sign and are both statistically significant.
In Table 12 we estimate a set of regressions similar to those in Table 10 but now substitute δ with d and include def in the set of controls. This is equivalent to estimating the model of Table 10 by relaxing the restriction that the coefficient of def is 1. We find that the def coefficient is always smaller than 1 but that that this coefficient is never significantly different from 1. All our other results are unchanged (this was expected because Table 6 already indicated that the deficit by itself explains an extremely small share of the within-country variance of the change in debt).
One problem with the regressions of Tables 10, 11 and 12 is that they assume a linear relationship between the dependent variable and the set of independent variables. Therefore, the estimated results might be driven by extreme values of δ . To address this issue, we relax the linearity assumption and run two sets of Probit regressions. In the first set of Probits, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes a value of 1 for all country years in the top decile of the distribution of δ . In the second set of Probits, we repeat the experiment using the bottom decile of the distribution of δ. 12 Table 13 reports the results for events in the top decile (in this group of events, δ ranges between 12.7 and 282 and has an average value of 44.5). We find that most of the results are similar to those in Table 10 . In particular, Column 1 shows that the relationship between real depreciations and the probability of observing an extreme event of δ increases with the level of external debt. Column 2 shows that in industrial countries, real depreciations have a negative (but not statistically significant) correlation with the probability of observing an extreme event of δ. This column also shows that in countries with high levels of external debt, depreciations are highly correlated with the probability of observing an extreme event. One puzzling result of Table 13 is that the coefficient of the DEFAULT dummy is large, significant, and positive (Column 3). This is exactly the opposite of what we expected, and may have to do with the fact that defaulted debt is not immediately subtracted from the stock of public debt. The coefficient of the BANKING CRISIS dummy variable instead has the expected positive sign. Besides being statistically significant, the impact of this variable is also economically important. In particular, the point estimates indicate that a banking crisis is associated with a 10 percent increase in the probability of observing an extreme event of δ. Table 14 focuses on events in the bottom decile of δ (in this group of events, δ ranges between -116 and -3.4 and has an average value of -10.9). As expected, we find that depreciations are negatively correlated with these types of events but the coefficients are rarely significant. In general, we find that our model does a very poor job of explaining these events.
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to document the fact that what is often considered a residual entity is indeed one of the key determinants of debt dynamic. After demonstrating the importance of the stock-flow reconciliation, this paper shows that this residual entity can be partly explained by contingent liabilities and balance-sheet effects. These results suggest that building a safer debt structure and implementing policies aimed at avoiding the creation of contingent liabilities are key to avoiding debt explosions (for contrasting views on how this can be achieved, see Goldstein and Turner, 2004 and Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2003) . However, this paper also shows that a large fraction of the variance of the stock-flow reconciliation cannot be explained by balance-sheet effects and our simple regressions. 13 13 One variable that is likely to be important but that we do not control for is the effect of court decisions that force the government to make payments (to public sector workers, for instance) that were not budgeted. We would like to thank Vito Tanzi for pointing this out. The income group and regional classifications are those used by the World Bank The income group and regional classifications are those used by the World Bank. * Excludes Guyana ** Excludes Israel The income group and regional classifications are those used by the World Bank The income group and regional classifications are those used by the World Bank. *Outliers are the top and bottom 2 percent of the distribution. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 
